Product DescriptionThis digital document is a journal article of the Journal of Health Economics from Elsevier published in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon. com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser. Description: A model of procurement for hospital treatment provided. are available for a given diagnosis of patients, two treatments are available: a high intensity (surgical) treatment and low-intensity treatment (medical). A buyer (National Health Service, public or private insurer) offers a contract to the provider (hospital) to benefit the patient, after deduction of costs to maximize. We show that, if known, the average severity of patients’ personal information by the supplier, the hospital an incentive to provide the surgical patients had low severity. The optimal contract with asymmetric information is such that hospitals with higher proportion of surgical treatments offer a higher price for the surgical treatment and to receive lower prices for medical treatment. This differs from the current salary, which is the price for each type of uniform treatment. It follows that in the context of asymmetric information optimal contract, a transfer rate higher with symmetric information relates.

Selection of treatment in the prospective payment systems in the hospital sector